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much as in the boldness of its interpretative framework, Gentlemen ofScience sets a standard
which historians ofother scientific - and medical -institutions will do well to emulate.
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SHIRLEY A. ROE, Matter, life, and generation. Eighteenth-century embryology and the
Haller-Wolffdebate, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. x, 214, illus., £16.00.
Professor Roe has set herself modest aims, but she fulfils them with convincing scholarship
and clarity ofexposition. Recognizing, as Jacques Roger showed in his magisterial Lessciences
de la vie dans la pense'e franCaise du XVIIie siecle, that eighteenth-century embryological
debate clustered around many diverse issues - e.g., the respective roles of male and female in
determining the embryo, animalculism, and ovism - Professor Roe has narrowed her focus to
one such debate, preformationism versus epigenesis, and offers a careful exposition of the
doctrines of the protagonists, Albrecht von Haller (1708-77) and Caspar Friedrich Wolff
(1734-94). She shows how Haller's preformationism derived much of its plausibility from the
inability of alternative theories to account for the appearance of organization in the emergent
embryo: whether Descartes's mechanical fermentation theory or the attempts of mid-century
naturalists such as Buffon and Maupertius to provide explanations of generative growth in
terms ofattractive forces. Haller'sexplanation that organization had been there all along (from
the Original Creation), merely too minute to be visible, begged plenty ofquestions, but meshed
with his Christian Newtonian mechanical philosophy: matter was passive; Nature had no
inherent power oforganization or ofspontaneousgeneration (ifmere natural forces determined
embryos, the world would be full of monsters and there would be no fixity of species). For
Haller, God had created all future generations - on ice, as it were - at the Creation. Wolffthe
epigenesist argued by contrast that the observable stage-by-stage growth of the embryo - he
chiefly studied chicks' eggs - represented real coming-into-being, not mere coming-into-
visibility. Operating within the framework ofthedynamic Rationalism ofLeibniz and Christian
Wolff, C. F. Wolff did not fear that invoking natural generational powers ("the essential
force") was tantamount to atheism. Rather, preformationism explained nothing, and was
peculiarly deficient, both as natural philosophy and as theodicy, at explaining limited change in
theliving world and monsters (had God formed embryo monsters too - at theCreation?).
As Professor Roe rightly perceives, the Haller-Wolffdebate was capable of no experimental
resolution in itsday, and both positions were to besuperseded in favour ofthe more teleological
embryology ofBlumenbach, Von Baer, and Kielmeyer. "In a very real sense Haller and Wolff
were living in different worlds" (p. 149), and this was because - and Professor Roe stresses this
as the main explanatory thrust ofher book - they held fundamentally different theological and
philosophical commitments.
This "history of ideas" approach is, ofcourse, admirable so far as it goes, though it is hardly
novel, and there is little in thegeneral interpretative framework ofthis book that is not familiar
already from the writings of Roger, Lovejoy, Guyenot, Hintzsche, Farley, etc., and from
Professor Roe's own published articles (though there is much welcome detail, including an
appendix of Wolff's letters to Haller). The book's limitation is that it does not even consider(if
only to reject) the broader contextual approaches pioneered by "structuralists" such as
Foucault (not listed in the bibliography) and by social historians ofideas. Once Professor Roe
hasdescribed themetaphysical andtheological differences betweeen Haller and Wolff, there the
explanation stops. There is no investigation of how far metaphysical commitments themselves
articulated deeper interests amongst the combatants (as surely must have been so in a man of
such polymathic concern as Haller). The narrow focus on the overt content of a debate between
two naturalists means little attention is given to such worrying contemporary ferments as the
speculative materialism ofthe French Enlightenment. Professor Roe has written an interesting
account; a richer one remains to bewritten, starting from her final page.
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